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KATZ IS DEAD. LONG LIVE KATZ.
Peter P. Swire*
Kat z v. U nited States is the king of Supreme Court surveillance
cases.1 Written in 1967, it struck down the earlier regime of property
rules, declaring that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places."2 The concurrence by Justice Harlan announced the new
regime - court-issued warrants are required where there is an
infringement on a person's "reasonable expectation of privacy."3
Together with the companion case Berger v. New York,4 Kat z has
stood for a grand conception of the Fourth Amendment as a bulwark
against wiretaps and other emerging forms of surveillance.
Professor Orin Kerr, in his excellent article, shows that this view of
Katz fits badly with how courts now apply the Fourth Amendment to
electronic surveillance and other new technology.5 Upon reading his
own obituary, Mark Twain famously observed that "reports of my
death are greatly exaggerated. "6 This Essay shows that the demise of
Katz

has actually been understated. Professor Kerr has correctly

shown how the property regime has persisted where it helped the
government, such as cases that hold that many kinds of surveillance
are not "searches" under the Fourth Amendment. This Essay adds the
insight that the property regime has actually been abandoned in many
other respects since 1967, in ways that have dramatically aided

*
Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law of the Ohio State University. A.B. 1980,
Princeton University; J.D. 1985, Yale Law School. - Ed. I became involved in the issues
discussed in this article during my time as Chief Counselor for Privacy in the U.S. Office of
Management and Budget and as Chair of a White House Working Group on how to update
wiretap and electronic surveillance law for the Internet age. My thanks for research support
from the Moritz College, and also for the graciousness of the George Washington University
Law School for providing an office for me when I am in D.C. In that setting I have enjoyed
numerous conversations with Orin Kerr. Thanks as well for helpful comments on this project
from Akhil Amar, Joshua Dressler, Mike Seidman, Marc Spindelman, and Eugene Volokh.

1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz, for instance, has been called the
"lodestar" in determining whether a government-initiated electronic surveillance is a search.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979).
2. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
3. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
4. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (striking down New York's wiretap statute
under the Fourth Amendment for failure to have sufficient safeguards).
5. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 799 (2004).
6. See THE NEW DIGnONARY OF CULTURAL
http://www.bartleby.com/59/6/reportsofmyd.htrnl.
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government surveillance. In particular, as discussed in Part I, the 1967
abolition of the "mere evidence" rule has given the government
unprecedented access to diaries, private papers, and other information
of individuals.
Examination of the case law and of new developments in
telephone technology leads to a second insight. The shift to Voice over
Internet Protocol phone calls means that the content of many
telephone calls will likely be subject to routine recording in the near
future. Because the Supreme Court has been so supportive of
government access to stored records, Katz and Berger may soon be
dead for their core facts, the content of phone calls.
If Katz is dead (or nearly so), what should be done? Professor Kerr
appears to welcome the demise of Katz. He argues at length that
Congress can do a better job than the courts at creating the law for
high-tech surveillance. This Essay criticizes that view, showing reasons
why Fourth Amendment doctrine should continue to play a role in
governing electronic surveillance and other high-tech searches. At a
minimum, the Court

should announce basic principles for how

surveillance can be conducted, with Congress then supplying the
details.
The end of Katz, perhaps even on its own facts, invites us to
consider what

alternative approaches

the courts might take in

structuring a regime for high-tech surveillance by the government.
This Essay sketches some of the substantive doctrines that courts
might workably enforce in defining Fourth Amendment searches. It
then explores in some detail the possibility that the courts can work
collaboratively with the elected branches to ensure that there are
reasonable procedures in place. The new regime would uphold the
rule of law, with reasonable procedures specified in advance. This
approach would give both the courts and the elected branches
appropriate roles in important categories of searches, such as those
involving emerging technologies, new types of surveillance, and
complex record-keeping systems.
I.

THE END OF THE PROPERTY REGIME AS SWORD, NOT SHIELD

A key achievement of Professor Kerr's article is to describe how
the property approach to the Fourth Amendment has survived Katz:
"[I]n most (though not all) cases, an expectation of privacy becomes
'reasonable' only when it is backed by a right to exclude borrowed
from real property law."7 He adds: "Although no one theory explains
the entire body of Fourth Amendment doctrine, property law provides

7. Kerr, supra note 5, at 808.
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a surprisingly accurate guide."8 Despite the many citations to Katz's
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test in the courts and in law
reviews, there has been no case beyond wiretapping where application
of the test has led to protection of privacy.9 Put mildly, Katz has not
10
been a good shield for privacy against intrusive new technologies.
Professor Kerr's article thus helps us to see clearly what is
happening
despite the comforting discussion of privacy
expectations, the courts continue to apply a property-based approach
to new technologies. This description, however, tells only half the
story. The Supreme Court did in fact abandon the property-based
approach in 1967 in ways that have continuing major effects, but it
actually did so in the direction of reducing the privacy protection
offered by prior law. In the same year as Katz, in Warden v. Hayden,11
the Supreme Court abolished the 'fmere evidence" rule. That rule had
previously set limits on the ability of a search warrant to authorize
collection of documents and other "mere evidence" of a crime. By
examining the shifts in the "mere evidence" rule, we can re-envision
the 1967 abandonment of the property-based approach as a sword for
greater entry into private spaces, and not the shield for protecting
privacy that most have supposed.
The "mere evidence" rule was a matter of common sense under
the property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment. A search
warrant could lawfully issue for items where the property interest of
the government was superior to that of the person holding the object.
Notably, an individual could claim no legitimate property interest in
the fruits of a crime, such as: stolen goods; its instrumentalities, such as
the knife used in the crime; or in contraband, such as illegal narcotics.
By contrast, a person's private papers were long understood to be
outside the reach of a search warrant under the authority of the 1765

8. Id. at 813. In response to comments to earlier drafts, Professor Kerr now has a more
modest claim about the extent to which the courts follow property rules. Professor Kerr
argues that the property regime is the single best predictor of Fourth Amendment doctrine,
but notes that "hyper-technical" property rules are not always followed. Although he briefly
mentions Warden v. Hayden, Professor Kerr does not discuss the great extent to which the
Fourth Amendment j urisprudence departs from the traditional property regime with respect
to the "mere evidence" rule. Id. at 843.

9. A possible exception is the requirement of a warrant before using the thermal
imaging equipment at issue in Ky/lo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). Even in this
instance, however, the majority decision by Justice Scalia heavily stresses the invasion of the
quintessential property interest, the home, as a crucial reason for the constitutional
protection. See Kerr, supra note 5, at 830-36 (discussing Ky/lo).
10. For an examination of the limited nature of current protections against video
surveillance and other "hyper-intrusive" searches, see Ric Simmons, Can Winston Save Us
from Big Brother? The Need for Judicial Consistency in Regulating Hyper-Intrusive Searches,
55 RUTGERS L. REV. 547, 556-60 (2003).
11. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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1
case of Entick v. Carrington, 2 as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Boyd v. United States13 and Gouled v. United States.14
Justice Brennan authored the opinion in Hayden that overturned
the "mere evidence" rule. He stated: "The premise that property
interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has
been discredited."15 Emphasizing that "the principal object of the
Fourth

Amendment

is

the

protection

of

privacy

rather

than

property,"16 he foreshadowed by less than a year the statement in Katz
that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Justice
Brennan seems to have contemplated a symmetry in the change of
doctrine. The "reasonable expectation of privacy" approach created a
doctrine that would apply both in settings where government powers
would expand (allowing seizure of the clothes found in Hayden) and
would recede (prohibiting the wiretap in Katz). It is likely that Justice
Brennan, writing for the liberal Warren Court, expected that the shift
from the property approach to the privacy approach would result in an
overall expansion of Fourth Amendment protections.
The opposite has occurred. On a doctrinal level, the Court has
been far stingier in finding a "reasonable expectation of privacy" than
Justice Brennan foresaw. The Court has swept aside limits on
government access to documents that would have existed under the
old property approach. The result of the new doctrine has been to
open the door to a far greater number of document searches than was
previously permitted. Aficionados of the Fourth Amendment are
familiar with the key cases. The focus here will be on how the
announced shift from the property to the privacy approach has
affected government access to records held by third parties.
The narrow scope of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test
was established in United States v. Miller, which involved subpoenas
for copies of checks written by the defendant.17 The court of appeals
struck down the subpoenas under the Fourth Amendment, citing the
prohibition in Boyd v. U nited States against " 'compulsory production
of a man's private papers to establish a criminal charge against him.'
"18 The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Powell for the majority found
that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Justice

12. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765) (holding that a warrant cannot
form the basis for the seizure of a person's private papers from the home).
13. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (ruling that compulsory production of a
person's private papers cannot establish a criminal charge against the defendant).
14. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (reiterating Boyd).
15. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 304.
16. Id.
17. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
18. Id. at 439.
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Powell quoted Katz itself in saying " '[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.'

"19

The crucial doctrinal finding was that the "checks are

not confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be
used in commercial transactions. "20 The subpoenas produced "only
information voluntarily conveyed to the banks." Justice Brennan
angrily dissented,21 but Miller today stands for a broad proposition
that individuals "voluntarily" reveal information when they give
documents or data to third parties. Based on this individual "consent"
to share data, the holders of data such as banks may pass on the
data to the

government without triggering Fourth Amendment

requirements.22
The limits of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test, and the
government's broad access to stored records, were reaffirmed in Smith
v.

Maryland.23

The

case

presented

the

question

whether

the

installation and use of a pen register constitutes a "search" under the
Fourth Amendment. "Pen registers" create a list of all of the numbers
dialed from a telephone, just as "trap and trace" devices create a list of
the numbers that call into a telephone.24 The Court held that there was
no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the list of phone numbers
dialed,

because

"petitioner

voluntarily

conveyed

to

[the

phone

company] information that it had facilities for recording and that it
was free to record."25 This emphasis on the government's access to

19. Id. at 442.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 447 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan did not believe there was true
consent by the bank customer because "it is impossible to participate in the economic life of
contemporary society without maintaining a bank account." Id. at 451 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590, 596 (Cal. 1974) (Mosk, J.)). To
permit the third party to share data with the government, without the Fourth Amendment
applying, "opens the door to a vast and unlimited range of very real abuses of police power."
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting (quoting Burrows, 529 P.2d at 596).
22. One subject for further investigation would be to show a more explicit link between
the abandonment of the "mere evidence" rule in Warden v. Hayden and the broad
conception of "voluntary" disclosure in Miller. It seems logical to believe that once the
government can get "mere evidence" from suspects themselves, it is easier to support the
doctrine that the government can get any evidence held in the hands of third parties.
23. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
24. For my views on a good legal regime for pen register and trap and trace orders, see
Peter P. Swire, Administration Wiretap Proposal Hits the Right Issues But Goes Too Far,
Brookings Terrorism Project Website (October 3, 2001), at http://www.brookings.edu/
dybdocroot/views/articles/fellows/2001_swire.htm [hereinafter Swire, Administration Wiretap
Proposal Hits the Right Issues But Goes Too Far] .
25. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745. The dissenting opinion by Justice Stewart would have found
that the Fourth Amendment applied to the telephone numbers dialed from a residence, and
said "I doubt there are any who would be happy to have broadcast to the world a list of the
local or long distance numbers they have called . . . and thus reveal the most intimate details
of a person's life." Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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stored records has become increasingly important over time, as
discussed further below.26
Although the Court found that the bank or the phone company
owned the records in these cases, . it made clear that defendants'
ownership of records would not protect those records from the
government. In Couch v. United States, the question was whether a
taxpayer

could

invoke

the Fifth

Amendment

privilege

against

compulsory self-incrimination to prevent the production of records in
the possession of her accountant.27 The Couch majority recognized the
defendant's property interest in the papers, yet ruled that the papers
had to be provided to the government.28 Later Supreme Court cases
similarly upheld the compelled production of documents where the
government lacked any ownership interest. 29 Some justices wrote
separately and at length to praise the cases protecting private papers
from

the eighteenth century (Entick

v.

Carrington),

nineteenth

century (Boyd v. United States), and twentieth century ( Gouled v.
United States). These justices condemned the unprecedented access of
government to private papers, but their opinions were in concurrences
and dissents.30
The Supreme Court also upheld the government's power to get
records from third parties in the face of significant countervailing
considerations. In Fisher v. United States, the government was able to
compel production of papers held by a defendant's attorney, despite
the attorney-client privilege.31 Perhaps even more surprisingly, in 1978,
Zurcher v. Stanford D aily permitted police to use a search warrant to
take records held by a newspaper, despite First and Fourth
A:nendment objections to the search.32 Justice Stevens in dissent

26. See infra Part IL Justice Stewart's dissent in Smith v. Maryland indicated the
reasoning of the majority: "[T]he Court today says that [Fourth Amendment] safeguards do
not extend to the numbers dialed from a private telephone, apparently because when a caller
dials a number the digits may be recorded by the telephone company for billing purposes."
442 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
27. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). This Fifth Amendment issue had not
arisen in Warden v. Hayden, which involved the question of whether production of a
defendant's clothing was permitted under the Fourth Amendment's "mere evidence" rule.
28. The majority said: "Here petitioner does own the business records which the
Government seeks to review . . . . " Id. at 327.
29. E.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (documents held by student
newspaper); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (documents held by an attorney).
30. E.g., Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 577-78 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 414 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); Id. at 431 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 489 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting);; California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 94 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Couch, 409 U.S. at 339 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
31. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
32. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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explained how the government search powers had expanded since the
demise of the "mere evidence" rule:
Just as the witnesses who participate in an investigation or a trial far
outnumber the defendants, the persons who possess evidence that may
help to identify an offender, or explain an aspect of a criminal
transaction, far outnumber those who have custody of weapons or
plunder. Countless law-abiding citizens - doctors, lawyers, merchants,
customers, bystanders - may have documents in their possession that
relate to an ongoing criminal investigation.33

Taken together, these cases show how Justice Brennan's vision in
writing Katz and Hayden was turned on its head. The end of the
property regime has become a sword for the government, not a shield
of personal privacy. Professor Kerr's article documents how courts
have clung to the property approach to assist the government, and
have denied claims of a "reasonable expectation of privacy." The
discussion here shows instead how courts have abandoned the
property approach to assist the government and have permitted
unprecedented access to documents and other stored information held
by third parties.
II.

ARE KA TZ AND BERGER ALIVE ON THEIR OWN FACTS TODAY?

Under the case law and emerging facts, there is a surprisingly
strong case for believing that Katz and Berger are no longer good law
even for the contents of telephone calls. The message of Miller was
that information voluntarily revealed to a third party, such as a bank,
does not enjoy a "reasonable expectation of privacy." The message of
Smith v. Maryland, as explained by Justice Stewart, was that Fourth
Amendment safeguards "do not extend to the numbers dialed from a
private telephone, apparently because when a caller dials a number
the digits may be recorded by the telephone company for billing
purposes."34 The Stored Communications Act, first enacted in 1986 in
the wake of Smith, permits the government to get access to the content
of stored communications from a communications provider without a
warrant.35 Its complex rules allow access to the content of e-mail and
other stored communications with less than probable cause.
What if the contents of ordinary telephone calls become stored as
a matter of routine? This technological change would arguably, and

33. Id. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

34. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
35. The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, provides a complex variety of
rules for government access to stored records, all of which are less strict than the traditional
Fourth Amendment search warrant. For a detailed analysis of the Act, see Orin G. Kerr, A
User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act - And a Legislator's Guide to Amending It,

72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
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plausibly, transform the recording of the telephone call into a stored
record subject to the Stored Communications Act. A search warrant
would no longer be required.
This slide from content protected by the Fourth Amendment to
stored records available under the Stored Communications Act has
already begun. Voice mails were historically given the same protection
as live telephone calls. The statutes implementing Katz and Berger had
required a probable-cause warrant with the strict safeguards provided
by Title III of the 1968 crime bill.36 In 2001, however, Congress
decided to treat voice mail as a stored record rather than the content
of a telephone call in Section 209 of the USA PATRIOT Act.37 The
statutory language on its face would appear to permit access to the
voice mail even if both parties were on the line having a
conversation.38
The looming question is what will happen if and when ordinary
phone calls themselves are routinely stored. This storage is likely to
become far more common with the imminent growth of Voice over
Internet Protocol ("VOIP") telephone calls.39 VOIP uses the packet
switching network of the Internet to connect telephone calls rather
than the traditional circuit-switching used by established phone
systems.40
Use of VOIP is likely to result in a drastic increase in storage of
the content of telephone calls for at least two reasons. First, the use of
computers for making telephone calls makes it trivially easy for one
party to store the contents of the conversation. This ease of storage
makes a telephone call more like an e-mail, where users can foresee
that the recipient may keep a copy of the communication or forward it
to others. Doctrinally, the ease of storage would make it easier for
36. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.
Stat. 197.
37. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub.

L.

L.

No. 90-351, 82

No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, § 209.

38. Both parties might be on the line, for instance, if the voice mail machine had started
recording before the recipient picked up the call or if the recipient simply turned on a voice
mail recorder during a conversation. Section 209 extends to all "wire"-stored records,
without consideration of whether there is a contemporaneous conversation between two
parties.
39. For one overview of the emerging market for VOiP, see Peter Grant, Ready for
Prime Time: A New Internet-Based Phone Technology Has an Un-Catchy Acronym: VOiP,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2004, at R7. Growth projections for VOiP vary widely, but the Wall
Street Journal reported in early 2004:
By the end of this year, about 20% of the new phones being shipped to U.S. businesses will
use VOiP technology, according to Yankee Group, a technology consulting firm based in
Boston. By 2007 that figure should exceed 50%, and eventually almost all of the new phones
shipped will use VOiP, Yankee Group predicts.
Id.

40. For one basic introduction to the technology, see Howstuffworks, "How Telephony
Works," at http://computer.howstuffworks.com/ip-telephony.htm (last visited July 9, 2004).
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future courts to say that a user has voluntarily consented to storage by
a third party. That storage, in tum, makes it less likely that the courts
will hold there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
communication.
A second technical change with VOiP is the likelihood that there
will be systematic "caching," or storage, of telephone communications
at the network level. One existing product, for instance, is called
"CacheEnforcer. "41 CacheEnforcer stores communications for a group
of users, such as for a company or a network operated by a university.
Network managers, not individual users, determine the caching
procedures. The caching can help the network in various ways,
including improving average network speed and assisting in network
security. Doctrinally, the existence of pervasive caching of telephone
communications could once again undermine the earlier holdings that
there is a "reasonable expectation of privacy" m telephone
communications.
The increasing storage of telephone calls is part of the much
broader expansion since 1967 of stored records in the hands of third
parties. Although there are no Supreme Court cases on most of these
categories of stored records, the Miller and Smith line of cases make it
quite possible that the government can take all of these records
without navigating Fourth Amendment protections. For instance,
voice mail was rare in 1967, and e-mail practically unknown. Video
cameras now exist in convenience stores, shopping malls, and a host of
other locations, so that the telephone booth used in Katz itself could
now easily be subject to recording. Financial transactions have shifted
away from cash to credit card, debit card, and other recorded
transactions.42 Individuals now store their calendars, personal diaries,
and family photographs online.43 Even the movements of individuals
are being increasingly recorded. With the rise of cellular telephones,
and the regulatory requirement that such phones be readily located,
the technology is in place to keep track of and store the movements of
cell-phone users.44
41. The product website says: "Because the CacheEnforcer sits in front of your WAN
[wide area network] or Internet link, all outbound traffic passes through it. By setting
appropriate policies on the CacheEnforcer, network managers, not individual users,
determine the appropriate caching policies for the entire network." Allot Communications
Products, CacheEnforcer, at http://www.allot.com/html/products_cacheenforcer.shtm (last
visited July 7, 2004).
42. On the shift from cash to recorded transactions, see Peter P. Swire, Financial Privacy
and the Theory of High- Tech Government Surveillance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 461 (1999)
[Hereinafter Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government
Surveillance].
43. See Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reconstructing Privacy in a World of'Business Records', 72
(forthcoming 2004).

GEO.WASH. L. REV.

44. See David J. Phillips, Beyond Privacy: Confronting Locational Surveillance in
Wireless Communication, 8 COMM . L. & POL'Y 1 (2003).
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SHOULD THE COURTS PLAY N0 ROLE IN HIGH-TECH
SEARCHES?

Once telephone calls are routinely stored, Katz and Berger may be
dead on their own facts. Under current doctrine, individuals have a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in the context of phone calls but
not in stored records. The Supreme Court has offered no reason why
stored records of telephone calls deserve constitutional protection
while stored records of voice mail, e-mail, financial records, personal
diaries, and locational information do not.
The factual shift to stored telephone calls puts enormous pressure
on the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. When applied to
searches outside of the home, the only category that has met that test
has been the content of telephone calls. With the spread of VOiP and
computerized storage, many and perhaps most phone calls will be
stored in the near future. In this future, current doctrine at most would
offer constitutional protections only to the dwindling subset of phone
calls that did not happen to be stored. As a matter of constitutional
doctrine, the broad wording of the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test is a very bad match for "the fraction of telephone calls
that are not stored." It is difficult to provide a principled basis for
protecting only that fraction of telephone calls under the Fourth
Amendment. Faced with these facts, courts very possibly would decide
that there is no "reasonable expectation of privacy" outside of the
home, and overrule Katz and Berger explicitly.
Although Professor Kerr does not specifically recommend
overruling Katz, he does argue that Congress should be the primary
protector of privacy against searches made by new technology. He
states: "courts should place a thumb on the scale in favor of judicial
caution when technology is in flux, and should consider allowing
legislatures to provide the primary rules governing law enforcement
investigations involving new technologies."45 In choosing Congress
over the courts, Professor Kerr argues that Congress can enact more
flexible rules, can amend them more frequently, and can gain a fuller
understanding of technology than the courts.46 This Part of the Essay
critiques Professor Kerr's minimalist view of the role of the courts in
applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies. At least four
categories of argument support a continuing and substantial role for
the courts: there are public choice problems with legislation in this
field; the dynamic that has led to privacy legislation in the past is
unlikely to continue in the future; constitutional pronouncements of
the courts help create appropriate privacy legislation; and courts and

45. Kerr, supra note 5, at 803.
46. Id. at 857.

Michigan Law Review

914

[Vol. 102:904

Congress working together can likely produce better results than
Congress alone.
A.

The Public-Choice Advantages of Law Enforcement O ver Privacy
Proponents

Professor Kerr is highly optimistic that Congress will reflect public
preferences in its surveillance laws, rather than be shaped by rent
seeking or other public-choice problems.47 I have written in greater
detail elsewhere why there instead appears to be a "ratchet-up effect"
- a systematic tendency toward permitting greater surveillance over
time in the legislative process.48 This tilt toward surveillance comes in
part from expertise and institutional staffing in federal law
enforcement agencies. As these agencies face the detailed
requirements of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and
similar statutes, they use their expertise much as any other regulated
industry would in response to regulations that limit its preferred
behavior.49 The regulated industry of law enforcement has a
concentrated interest in reducing regulation - pushing for fewer
warrants, less onerous reporting requirements, and so on. The
concentrated interest in reducing regulation contrasts with the
dispersed interest the general public has in protecting privacy over the
long term.
This classic public-choice problem of a concentrated industry
defeating a dispersed public interest is exacerbated here by the
existence of a mechanism law enforcement can use to achieve its
deregulation goals. Whenever there is a dramatic public-safety
emergency, the law-enforcement agencies rush to lock expanded
powers into legislation before the emergency fades away.
The differing fate of surveillance legislation proposed before and
after the attacks of September 11 illustrates this pattern. After a
lengthy internal process, the Clinton administration proposed
legislation in the summer of 2000 that contained both expanded
powers for law enforcement and new privacy protections.50 The House

47. Id. at 884 (stating that congressional action "generally reflects legitimate public
preferences," however, not rent-seeking).
48. Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Law].
49. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (explaining advantages that concentrated interests,
such as regulated industries, have over diffuse interests in the political process).
50. I chaired the White House Working Group that considered the proposal, which was
introduced in 2000 as S. 3083. See Press Release, The White House, Assuring Security and
Trust in Cyberspace (July 17, 2000), at www.peterswire.net (announcing legislation proposed
by Chief of Staff John D. Podesta in remarks at the National Press Club). For the text of
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Judiciary Committee considered the proposal in the fall of 2000, and
overwhelmingly amended it in the direction of greater privacy
protections. 5 1 The support for privacy legislation was not enough to
advance the legislation further, however. Both law-enforcement
advocates and privacy advocates had enough strength to freeze the
status quo into place and block provisions that they opposed.
The freeze thawed immediately, however, after the attacks of
September 11, 2001. The USA PATRIOT Act, drafted within a few
days of the attacks, contained many of the pro-law-enforcement
provisions that were contained in the 2000 Clinton proposal. It
contained none of the pro-privacy proposals. Notably, it also
contained a number of items from the law-enforcement "wish list"
which had been omitted in the 2000 proposal. 25 A similar pattern
occurred after the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center and the
1995 Oklahoma City bombing - quick introduction and then passage
of legislation that expanded law-enforcement powers. 5 3 In light of
these episodic, repeated expansions of law-enforcement powers, there
is reason to believe that Congress will err over time on the side of
surveillance and against privacy.
B.

The End of the Historical Patterns for Enacting Privacy
Legislation

Professor Kerr accurately notes that Congress has several times
enacted legislation containing privacy provisions. He uses this fact to
bolster his conclusion that "Congress has often taken the lead and . . .
judicial decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment generally have
played a secondary role."54 In fact, however, the role of the judiciary
has been far more important than this quotation suggests. Supreme
Court decisions have played a primary role in prompting and shaping
privacy legislation to date. Congressional actions, when they have

Podesta's remarks, see Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President's Chief
of Staff John D. Podesta on Electronic Privacy to National Press Club (July 18, 2000), at
www.peterswire.net.
51. Molly M. Peterson, Panel Approves E-Mail, Phone Privacy Protections, 32 NAT'L J.
3099 (2000).
52. For instance, Section 217 of the USA PATRIOT Act creates new authority for the
government to receive e-mails and other electronic communications of "computer
trespassers" without the need for a search warrant or other judicial process. A computer
trespasser exception was considered but rejected for the 2000 legislation. See Swire,
Administration Wiretap Proposal Hits the Right Issues But Goes Too Far, supra note 24
(comparing 2000 and 2001 legislative proposals).
53. See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108
Stat. 4279 (1994); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214.
54. Kerr, supra note 5, at 853.
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occurred, have generally given far less protection than the Fourth
Amendment norm of a probable cause warrant issued by a neutral
magistrate. In addition, the way that the Court's decisions have
influenced the legislature is unlikely to occur in the future, boding ill
for privacy protections against new generations of high-technology
searches.
The essential point is that Fourth Amendment cases generally
offer a sharp yes/no choice between two positions. If the government
action is a "search," then there are relatively strict rules. A neutral
magistrate must decide whether "probable cause" has been shown. If
the government action is not a "search," then the Fourth Amendment
does not limit the governnient's access to the records.
The privacy legislation cited by Professor Kerr was enacted in
response to Supreme Court decisions that government actions did not
constitute a "search." Congress then stepped in to protect privacy
interests, usually with statutory provisions less strict than a warrant
requirement. For instance, the 1976 decision in United States v. Miller
found no Fourth Amendment interest in bank records.55 Congress
responded in 1978 with the Right to Financial Privacy Act,56 which was
considerably less strict than getting a search warrant. An
administrative summons is enough to get the records, without the need
for a neutral magistrate.57 Furthermore, the government need believe
only that the records are "relevant to a legitimate law enforcement
inquiry," rather than having to show probable cause.58 In 1979, in
Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court found no reasonable
expectation of privacy in pen-register information.59 Congress
responded with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.(j()
That law sets forth a standard well below probable cause and calls for
only a limited role for the magistrate. That magistrate "shall" issue the
order whenever law enforcement "has certified to the court that the
information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation."61 A third example is the
1978 case of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, where the Supreme Court
found no need for a warrant in the search of a newspaper office for
information about news sources.62 The Privacy Protection Act of 1980

55. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
56. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000).
57. Id. § 3405.
58. Id.
59. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
60. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (2000).
62. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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was enacted to fill that gap.63 That Act is the only example on the list
where the legislative privacy protections are at all comparable to the
protections offered by a search warrant.
At least four mutually reinforcing reasons underscore the
importance of judicial decisions to how these privacy protections were
enacted. First, the Supreme Court decision made the issue more
salient, focusing attention on a topic that otherwise would not climb to
the top of the legislative agenda.64 Second, the importance of the
decision to the political process was greater because of what social
scientists have called the "endowment effect"65 or "status quo bias."66
Described as "the most significant single finding from behavioral
economics for legal analysis to date," the concept is that individuals
experience a loss as more important than a gain of equal size.67
Applied to the Fourth Amendment cases, the "status quo bias" helps
us understand why the perceived "loss" of Fourth Amendment
protections (in the eyes of those who previously believed the records
were protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy) would be a
spur to legislative action. Third, the opinions of the Supreme Court
shaped the legislative debates. Vigorous dissents in each case
articulated reasons why privacy protections should be considered
important. The dissenting opinions would persuade some legislators
that full Fourth Amendment protections were appropriate, but they
could help persuade additional legislators that some sorts of legal
protection, even at a lower level, should be enacted. Fourth, once the
issue had moved high enough on the agenda to warrant a vote, there
were persuasive public-policy arguments that some privacy protections
were appropriate.68 Otherwise, under the Supreme Court's holdings of
no "search," the police would be able to see the private records
without any legal process whatsoever.
The mutually reinforcing reasons for privacy legislation are
unlikely to occur in the future. The triumph of the jurisprudence of
Mill er and Smith suggests little room for new decisions by the

63. 42 U . S. C . § 2000aa (2000).
64.

For one good discussion of how issues rise and fall on a legislative agenda, see
Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 191-94 (1990).
65. The term was coined by Richard Thaler. Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory
of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 0RG. 39, 44 (1980).
66. See, e.g. , William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision
Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).

67. See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
1227, 1229 (2003).
68. Levine & Forrence, supra note 64, at 191-93 (explaining why legislators are more
likely to vote for their view of good public policy, rather than follow the wishes of special
interest groups, once an issue has become salient).

918

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 102:904

Supreme Court that would prompt congressional action. Perhaps
Congress would act if Katz were explicitly overruled or if the thermal
imaging at issue in Ky/lo were permitted.69 Other than that, the factors
that have historically led to limits on government access to records will
not likely exist in the future. These past examples of privacy
legislation do not support Professor Kerr's confidence that Congress
will be aggressive in crafting privacy protections in the future.70
There is one other historical pattern for passage of privacy
legislation, but that pattern does not fit Professor Kerr's thesis either.
The Supreme Court has sometimes emphasized the importance of
Fourth Amendment protections in an opinion and then invited
Congress to fill in the legislative details. Professor Kerr documents
how Congress was awaiting the outcome of Berger and Katz and used
those opinions as the basis for the Title III protections of telephone
wiretaps and bugging.71 In 1972, the Court examined how the Fourth
Amendment would apply to national-security cases, and the guidance
in United States v. United States District Court (known as the Keith
case) became the roadmap for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978.72
In summary, Professor Kerr supports having Congress take
primary responsibility for enacting new privacy protections as
technology evolves. One criticism here is that privacy legislation to
date has relied on a combination of factors, notably including a
Supreme Court case finding no "search," that is unlikely to occur in
the future. The second criticism is that the remaining privacy
enactments have occurred in situations where the Supreme Court has
acted in partnership with Congress - the Court announced
constitutional principles while inviting the legislature to fill in the
details. As argued below, this sort of partnership is an attractive model
for applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies. That

69. One might also see congressional action if the Supreme Court specifically held that
medical records or private e-mails lacked Fourth Amendment protections. To date, neither
of these cases has been presented to the Court.
70. There is one other possible combination of political forces that might lead to future
legislation in the area. It is possible that changing technology will mean that law
enforcement will see a need to gain specific authorities that were not previously as
important. In that case, there is the possibility of a political compromise where law
enforcement will gain those specific authorities while going along with privacy protections as
part of a compromise. To understand the concept, consider how changing patterns of
telephone use, including the possibility of buying several inexpensive cellular phones, has
made it more important over time for law enforcement to have roving wiretap authority
rather than the authority to tap a single phone line. Before the roving wiretap authority was
authorized, it might have been tempting for law enforcement officials to agree to some new
privacy protections if that were the price needed to get the roving wiretap authority.
71. Kerr, supra note 5, at 847.
72. Id. at 853 n.320 (describing the "extensive statutory guidance to Congress"); see also
Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, supra note 48.
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partnership, however, is contrary to Professor Kerr's approach. A
review of the legislation to date shows little reason for confidence,
despite the hopes of Professor Kerr, that Congress will step forward
on its own to create limits on the government power to search records.
C.

How Retreat by the Court Would Likely Reduce Privacy
P rotections in the Political P rocess

There is another way that reducing the courts' role in the Fourth
Amendment would likely affect Congress's passage of privacy
legislation. The title of Professor Kerr's article expresses the idea that
the reasonable expectation of privacy has become a myth: The Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case
for Caution.

Professor Kerr calls for discarding that myth, and instead
having a Fourth Amendment "with constitutional rules governing
most traditional cases and statutory rules governing most cases
involving new technologies."73 As discussed here, the Kerr approach
would quite likely result in an impoverishment of the legislative
debate about privacy and surveillance, and less effective deliberation
on what safeguards are appropriate.
One chief flaw of the Congress-only approach is the ease with
which proponents of surveillance can argue that the Constitution
supports their position. A 2003 speech by Attorney General John
Ashcroft shows how the Department of Justice claims that judicial
acquiescence to searches shows approval for those searches:
Since September 11, 2001, the Department of Justice has fought for,

Congress has created, and the j udiciary has upheld, legal tools that honor
the Constitution .... It is

a compliment

to all who worked on the Patriot

Act to say that it is not constitutionally innovative. The Act uses court
tested safeguards and

time-honored ideas to aid the war against

. . . 74
This passage wraps itself in the Constitution. It asserts that the
PATRIOT Act contains "legal tools that honor the Constitution," "is
not constitutionally innovative," and uses "court-tested safeguards."
Each of these claims is subject to serious doubt. 75 Nonetheless, one can
terrorism

.

73. Kerr, supra note 5, at 887.
74. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks at the Federalist Society
National Convention (Nov. 15, 2003), at http://www.politechbot.com/pipermail/politech/
2003-November/000218.html.
75. For instance, prior to the PATRIOT Act federal courts had held that the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") required that "the primary purpose" of the
surveillance must be foreign intelligence. See, e.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d
Cir. 1984). Because Section 218 of the PATRIOT Act, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7),
said that only "a significant purpose" of the legislation had to be for foreign intelligence, the
PATRIOT Act raised the novel issue of whether secret FISA wiretaps could be used
primarily for ordinary criminal investigations. See generally Swire, The System of Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Law, supra note 48.
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see how the cases discussed earlier in this Essay might support the
claim that there are "court-tested safeguards" - the courts have
indeed been presented with cases involving bank records, pen
registers, and other sorts of records and have found there is no
"search" under the Fourth Amendment. The safeguards under
statutes such as the Right to Financial Privacy Act and the Stored
Records Act are "court tested" in the sense that they have not been
struck down as unconstitutional.
To sophisticated readers from the legal academy, there is a clear
and large difference between a description of the Court's holdings no "search" prohibited by the Fourth Amendment - and the claim
that a particular surveillance technique is normatively desirable. In the
political realm, however, the two statements can readily merge into
the following: the courts have "tested" these safeguards, they are "not
constitutionally innovative," and therefore the surveillance techniques
are good.
The insight here is to recognize the moral and political authority of
constitutional doctrine. The Constitution is imbued with what
Madison in The Federalist called "that veneration which time bestows
on everything."76 The political criticisms of the PATRIOT Act, for
instance, repeatedly state that it is unconstitutional. A Google search
in late 2003 for "PATRIOT Act privacy unconstitutional" revealed
17 ,900 hits.77 The way we Americans debate these issues is intimately
intertwined with our view of the constitutional rules governing the
government and the people. A great risk of the Congress-centered
approach advocated by Professor Kerr is that the political and moral
debate will be impoverished if the Court abandons the reasonable
expectation of privacy test for high-technology surveillance.
Professor Kerr might respond, accurately, that he does not make
the analytic mistake inherent in Attorney General Ashcroft's speech.
Professor Kerr instead presents institutional arguments about why
Congress acting alone will create better rules. He might argue, in
addition, that the political debates might actually improve once
everyone recognizes that Congress will have to take responsibility for
the issues and the courts will not provide a constitutional safety net.
In response, although it is possible that Professor Kerr's estimate
of the political debate will prove true, there is a great risk that it will
not and that we will end up with considerably fewer protections

76. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
77. The search was conducted on December 22, 2003 at www.google.com. Review of a
sample of those sites shows repeated arguments that surveillance provisions in the
PATRIOT Act are both bad policy and contrary to the Constitution. Another Google
search, on the same date, of "PATRIOT Act unconstitutional privacy reasonable
expectation" turned up 1,590 hits. Many of the sites based their arguments about
unconstitutionality on the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test.
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against intrusive government surveillance. For one thing, the
discussion above 78 of statutes such as the Right to Financial Privacy
Act and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act showed that the
protections enacted by Congress were far less protective than a Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement would have been for the same
surveillance. The only statute that came up to the Fourth Amendment
level of protection was the Privacy Protection Act, where the
equivalent of constitutionally required warrants was created for the
narrow category of searches of publishers for material protected by
the First Amendment. In short, when it has acted, Congress has
enacted privacy protections considerably weaker than those imposed
by the Fourth Amendment. In addition, as argued in the previous
section, the historical pattern for Congress legislating - reacting to a
controversial Supreme Court decision finding no "search" - is less
likely to occur in the future.
Professor Eugene Volokh has made an intriguing additional
argument about why Congress may be reluctant to enact privacy
legislation in areas where the courts have found that the government is
acting constitutionally. Professor Volokh argues that Congress may be
acting in a "rationally ignorant" way when it defers to the
constitutional holdings of the courts:
The proper scope of police searches, for instance, is a complex issue.
Most people lack well-developed, comprehensive philosophies on the
subject that would give them clear answers to most police search
questions. So instead of thinking deeply through the matter themselves,
they may choose to defer to the Court's expert j udgment, if they think
that the Justices are usually (even if not always) right on such questions.
Because people lack the time and ability to figure out what's right or
wrong entirely on their own, they use legal rules as one input into their
79
judgments.

A shift from the reasonable expectations of privacy test to the Kerr
approach, in short, risks damage to the political guarantees against
excessive surveillance. The shift could impoverish the rhetoric about
the risks of new surveillance, undercut existing arguments that
prov1s10ns are unconstitutional, and bolster the analytically
questionable argument that a statute is good just because the courts
have decided not to strike it down.

78. See supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
79. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116
1080 (2003).
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The Potential for Privacy Protection by Both Congress and the
Courts

Professor Kerr comes down strongly on the side of Congressional
rather than judicial protection of privacy rights: "legislatures often are
better situated than courts to protect privacy in new technologies."80
While stressing that the courts should be "cautious" in holding that the
Fourth Amendment applies to new technologies,81 Professor Kerr at
no time indicates a single new technology that merits a finding of a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" or the need for a Fourth
Amendment search warrant. My own position, by contrast, is that
courts properly can and should play a significant role in defining how
the Fourth Amendment applies to new technologies. The history of
privacy legislation reveals that judicial holdings and language have
shaped subsequent legislation in intricate and helpful ways.
Dialogue and continued participation by both branches is likely to
lead to better outcomes, for both majoritarian and counter
majoritarian reasons. As a matter of majoritarian politics, the analysis
here shows public-choice reasons for believing that legislation will tilt
over time toward greater surveillance than the public would wish; the
patterns of legislation suggest that episodic crises will lead to
authorization for expanded surveillance. At the same time, the main
stimuli for privacy legislation against government surveillance are less
likely to exist in the future.82
The counter-majoritarian role of the courts also counsels that
courts continue to involve themselves in high-technology
surveillance.83 The Bill of Rights exists in large measure to provide a
check on the passions of the majority as it acts through the legislative
branch. Political opponents of the government, civil rights groups,
non-citizens, and other minority groups have historically been the
targets of intrusive surveillance.84 It is emphatically the role of the

80. Kerr, supra note 5, at 886-87.
81. Id. at 806.
82. I have written elsewhere about how the gap between long-term and short-term
preferences may lead to an undervaluing of the public's actual preferences about privacy.
There appears to be a large preference in the long run for privacy protection, in order to
avoid creating a "Big Brother" society. In the short-term, however, individuals often seem
willing to give up privacy protection in favor of security, efficiency, and other goods. See
Peter P. Swire, Efficient Confidentiality for Privacy, Security, and Confidential Business
Information, BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES (2003).
83. The counter-majoritarian role for the courts is most prominently articulated in JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); see also Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian
Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491 (1997) (defending the
counter-majoritarian approach).
84. For this history, see Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law,
supra note 48. On the ways that intrusive surveillance has targeted minority groups and
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judiciary to enforce the Fourth Amendment and other constitutional
protections where there is such good reason to suspect majoritarian
abuses.
IV.

LONG LIVE KA TZ

-

NEXT STEPS FOR THE COURTS

The death of Katz would create a very odd constitutional regime
where the most common and extensive searches - those using
effective new technologies - are placed outside of the Fourth
Amendment. The development of VOIP creates a reductio ad
absurdum, in which the only expectations of privacy that are
constitutionally "reasonable" are the dwindling few telephone calls
that do not happen to be stored anywhere. In the face of this
absurdity, the Supreme Court should find a new path that preserves an
effective role for the courts while also adapting to changing
technology. This Essay is not committed to explaining precisely what
doctrine the courts should then adopt. Instead, the Essay sketches
both substantive and procedural doctrines that could create a new life
for Katz. The proposals here would help create a constitutional regime
with a manageable judicial role likely to meet both the public-safety
and privacy goals of the Fourth Amendment.
A.

More Substance for the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy " Test

Courts could maintain a role for the Fourth Amendment and
rescue the Katz and Berger holdings by giving greater substance to the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test. Put simply, the courts could
engage in a more substantive review of expectations of privacy in
specific factual settings, and find that more categories of government
action violate that test. This approach would recognize how the
doctrines of consent and stored records now mean that there is rarely
a high-tech "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Scholars such as Patricia Bellia and Deirdre Mulligan are now
exploring doctrinal approaches for treating some communications as
"searches" under the Fourth Amendment.8 5 One example would be to
consider it a "search" when a third party, acting as a virtual bailor of
data, reveals that data to the government. An Internet Service
Provider ("ISP"), for instance, may promise to hold a user's e-mails on
a secure server. The ISP would have reason to access those e-mails
only in extraordinary situations similar to when a phone company
listens to a call. In both instances, the company appropriately accesses
otherwise been a tool of discrimination, see Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High
Tech Government Surveillance, supra note 42.
85. Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 72 (forthcoming 2004); Mulligan, supra note 43.
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the communications for purposes of maintaining the system, but
otherwise does not learn the content of communications. These bailor
situations can be distinguished from a bank processing a payment,
where bank employees routinely see the content of the
communications (payor, payee, amount of payment, etc.) as an
ordinary part of the transaction.
Privileged communications, such as with a medical provider or
member of the clergy, could comprise another distinguishable
category. Where a jurisdiction recognizes a testimonial privilege, there
is a strong argument that the individual has not "consented" to tum
the information over to the government simply because the
information is in the hands of a third party. A database of electronic
medical records or e-mails to a member of the clergy would be strong
candidates for protection under a substantively enhanced "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test.
A likely objection from Professor Kerr would be that courts lack
the necessary expertise to understand the technology and create good
categories for stricter Fourth Amendment protections. But there are
standard ways that courts have managed to address issues involving
complex technology in other contexts. Notably, courts in products
liability and other cases have learned to use expert testimony about
the technology. Defendants seeking to show a "reasonable expectation
of privacy" in a factual setting might introduce this kind of expert
testimony. Similarly, courts might draw on polling data to learn about
the public's expectations of privacy. In discerning those expectations,
courts could also review legislative enactments, which may be
persuasive evidence of greater public concern about certain categories
of surveillance.
In this brief Essay, there is no opportunity to flesh out all the
details of a regime with a stricter substantive test for "reasonable
expectation of privacy." Academics such as Professors Mulligan and
Bellia are currently examining these doctrinal categories. More
broadly, perhaps other experts in evidence and criminal procedure can
pursue the best mechanisms for creating and administering these
substantive categories.
B.

A Procedural Test for the "Reasonableness " of High- Tech
Surveillance

Less explored to date is a complementary way for courts not to
abdicate all responsibility for the rules of high-technology surveillance.
This approach would require judicial review of the reasonableness of
the process used to create surveillance rules. This sort of test for
reasonable process had been proposed previously, but apparently not
for the subset of searches that involve emerging technologies and
complex record-keeping systems. I offer arguments here why the
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requirement of a reasonable process is especially appropriate for those
categories of searches.
The proposal here builds on at least five different sources:
Professor Amsterdam's call for "reasonable particularity" in drafting
rules for searches under the Fourth Amendment; Professor Simon's
explanation for why procedural rather than substantive rationality is
more appropriate in complex technological settings; Professor Amar's
emphasis on the general "reasonableness" requirement under the
Fourth Amendment; the jurisprudence under Article 8 of the
European Convention of Human Rights, where the European Court
of Human Rights has required legislatures to set forth in advance the
rules for surveillance; and the U.S. Supreme Court's own successes in
Katz, Berger, and Keith in prompting Congress to craft detailed rules
governing surveillance.
First, the procedural approach builds on the proposal of Professor
Anthony Amsterdam in his classic article, P erspectives on the Fourth
Amendment.86 Professor Amsterdam emphasized the need to cabin the
discretion of law-enforcement officials in conducting surveillance. He
proposed a three-part rule:
(1) Unless a search or seizure is conducted pursuant to and in conformity
with either legislation or police departmental rules and regulations, it is
an unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by the fourth amendment.

(2) The legislation or police-made rules must be reasonably particular in
setting

forth

the

nature

of

the

searches

and

seizures

and

the

circumstances under which they should be made. (3) The legislation or
rules must, of course, be conformable with all additional requirements
imposed by the fourth amendment upon searches and seizures of the
sorts that they authorize.87

The principal argument supporting this approach was the importance
of cabining discretion and protecting against arbitrary searches and
seizures.88 Similar proposals have been made by other eminent
authorities.89
The case for court review of reasonable procedures is significantly
stronger if limited to the context of emerging technologies.90 One
86. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349 (1974).
87. Id. at 416-17.
88. Id. at 419.
89. E.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
52-161 (1969); John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027,
1050-55 (1974); Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1972).
90. I do not take a position here about the precise effect of a failure by law enforcement
to write surveillance rules in advance. Professor Amsterdam's proposal was apparently to
find the search unreasonable per se in the absence of prior written rules. An alternative
would be for courts to give substantially greater deference where prior rules exist, but not to
find the lack of rules necessarily fatal to a search.

926

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 102:904

reason is that the procedural review can occur for a relatively
contained subset of Fourth Amendment searches. Professor
Amsterdam's proposal sought to apply more broadly, including for
ordinary stops on the street and other traditional searches. It is
possible, however, that judges would be hesitant to insist on
formalized rulemaking for so many different types of searches. Instead
of insisting on written rules for all searches, a better approach might
be to allow judges to reach their own judgments, based on their own
experience, about the constitutionality of traditional searches. Judges
would use the procedural test in more limited settings, for emerging
technologies, new types of surveillance, and complex record-keeping
systems. The requirement of prior written rules would be less
burdensome when applied to this subset of searches. Investigative
guidelines might be written, for instance, for a relatively contained set
of categories such as location information from cell phones, pen
register orders, the contents of e-mail or telephone conversations, and
so on. The effort of writing these rules would be limited to the
complex, technical settings where judges are less likely to have
personal experience about the reasonableness of police conduct.
A second source, the writings of Nobel laureate Herbert Simon,
underscores the likelihood that procedural review is especially
appropriate in complex, technical settings. In his book The Sciences of
the Artificial, Professor Simon studied complexity based on his
research into economics, cognitive psychology, computer science, and
related fields.91 A central point of his research is that the nature of
rationality changes in the face of additional complexity. For simpler
problems, a decisionmaker seeks "substantive rationality." Roughly
speaking, that means getting the correct answer. In Fourth
Amendment terms, for instance, that would mean the courts would
reach a judgment in a particular case about whether the Fourth
Amendment would apply. As problems become more complex and
difficult to understand, however, Simon stresses that one shifts to
"procedural rationality." As complexity rises, the best one can hope
for is to design a good process. We become willing to accept the
judgment of appropriate decisionmakers acting in their areas of
expertise, subject to review where needed.
In Fourth Amendment terms, the complex and shifting problems
raised by new technologies call out for a "procedural rationality"
approach. A manageable role for the courts is to police the system to
ensure that reasonable rules are drafted for the new technologies. The
absence of any legal rule is a red flag suggesting that no responsible
officials have yet defined where surveillance is permitted or not.

91.

HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL

(1981).
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A third source is Professor Akhil Amar's work, drawing on earlier
work by Telford Taylor and others, on the nature of "reasonableness"
under the Fourth Amendment.92 Professor Amar has emphasized that
the text of the Fourth Amendment has distinct clauses. The Warrant
Clause, requiring a probable-cause warrant signed by a neutral
magistrate, was the focus of most of the attention when the Supreme
Court issued Katz and crafted other doctrines that limited unlawful
searches. Professor Amar contrasts this with the opening language of
the Fourth Amendment, which states: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."93 In order
to enforce this general reasonableness requirement, Professor Amar
writes: "[T]he less specifically the legislature has considered and
authorized the practice in question, the less willing judges and juries
should be to uphold the practice. "94
There may be a special reason to use this reasonableness approach
in areas involving emerging technologies and complex record-holding
systems. Statutory and regulatory privacy schemes already tend to be
more nuanced. The medical-privacy rules in the United States, for
instance, have complex provisions for medical research,9 5 public
health,96 and especially for disclosure to law-enforcement officials.97
Disclosures in some instances require much less of a showing than
probable cause, such as for medical research that is done under
procedural safeguards. Disclosure of a medical file to the police, by
contrast, requires a greater showing of need, with even stricter rules
applying to psychotherapy notes.98 The degree of complexity in
medical-privacy rules, which is mirrored in regimes such as those for
financial privacy99 and electronic communications,100 suggests the
92. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757
(1994). Professor Amar dedicates this article to the memory of Telford Taylor, and the
article builds generally on TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1969).
93. The amendment in full provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV.
94. Amar, supra note 92, at 816.
95. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (2003).
96. Id. § 164.512(b).
97. Id. § 164.512(f), (i).
98. Id. § 164.512(e). The provision for psychotherapy notes is at id. § 164.508(a)(2).
99. Financial-privacy rules are contained in Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of
1999. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827 (2000). The complex exceptions, which permit greater
disclosure, are contained in Section 502(e) of the Act. Id. § 6802.
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bluntness of a one-size-fits-all warrant requirement.101 The medical
privacy rules were issued after the Department of Health and Human
Services received over 50,000 comments on an enormous range of
issues,102 and it is unlikely that the one-size-fits-all warrant would be
appropriate for that whole range of situations.
A fourth source, less familiar to most American scholars, is the
body of law developed under Article 8 of the European Convention
on Human Rights.103 The European Court of Human Rights has used
Article 8 on a number of occasions to strike down surveillance
practices of the member states. Because the wiretapping and other
surveillance practices in the member states and the United States are
so similar, it is illuminating to see how the Court has interpreted
Article 8 to set limits on high-technology searches while also
permitting the elected branches to create the actual rules governing
such surveillance.
The text of Article 8 echoes the Fourth Amendment. Paragraph
One says: "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence." This language echoes the
"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects." Paragraph Two says: "There shall be no interference by a
public authority with the exercise of this right except as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of" various public purposes such as national security and the
prevention of crime.104 This language echoes the ban on "unreasonable
searches and seizures," although with differences noted below.
Jurisprudence under Article 8 has emphasized that surveillance
must be done "in accordance with the law." In 1979, the European
Court of Human Rights interpreted this term, saying:

100. 18 u.s.c. §§ 2701-2711 (2000).
101. For a contrasting view, arguing for warrants across a very wide range of
circumstances, see Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
102. For information on the development of the medical-privacy rule, see http:l/www.
hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa.
103. For a discussion of the structure of the European Court of Human Rights, see
Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 293-97 (1997). For discussions of the role of Article 8 in
governing surveillance by the member states, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG,
INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 691-713 (2003). For a discussion of Article 8 within the
broader context of international human rights law, see George E. Edwards, International
Human Rights Law Challenges to the New International Criminal Court: The Search and
Seizure Right to Privacy, 26 YALE J. INT'L. L. 323, 396-98 (2001).

104. The full list of public purposes that may justify interference with Article 8 rights
are: "national security, public safety[,] the economic well-being of the country . . . the
prevention of disorder or crime . . . the protection of health or morals, [and] . . . the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
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First, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to
have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules
applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a
'law' unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen
to regulate his conduct. 1 05

The requirement of sufficient precision is most relevant to the idea
that the U.S. Supreme Court should adopt a procedural view of the
"reasonableness" of surveillance actions. The 2001 case of P. G. & J. H.
v. United Kingdom gives a sense of the European Court's approach.106
In that case, individuals challenged the government's ability to get
billing records on telephone calls.1 0 7 The Court upheld this
government action, saying that detailed statutes governing billing
records meant that the search was "in accordance with the law." On
the other hand, the Court acted to strike down government action in
response to the individuals' complaint: "that their voices were
recorded secretly when they were being charged in the police station
and while they were being held in their cells. "108 The Court stated that
"the police knew that the applicants had refused to provide voice
samples voluntarily and sought to trick them into speaking in an
underhand procedure which was wholly unregulated, arbitrary and
attended by bad faith."1 09 Due in large part to this lack of established
procedures, the Court found that the covert taping violated Article 8.
In order to carry out such searches, the United Kingdom would need
to create a legal structure to guard against the possibility of abuse.11°
The well-developed jurisprudence under Article 8 can inform U.S.
law for a number of reasons. For one thing, the nature of surveillance,
searches, and technology is much the same in the United States and
the member states of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Telephone calls, e-mails, and credit card records are quite similar. For
another, the tension between liberty and public safety is much the
same, with member states such as Britain and Spain having faced

105. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, 271 para. 49 (1979). In
addition, legal rules would need to comply with the Article 8 language that the search be
"necessary in a democratic society." This has been interpreted to mean that the surveillance
be "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued." Solove & Rotenberg, supra note 103, at
694. This proportionality test is similar to the requirement in U.S. law that searches be
"reasonable."
106. 9 Eur. Ct. H. R. 197 (2001).
107. This information could be obtained in the United States under the Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000) , or through pen-register or trap-and-trace
orders, 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2000).
108. P.G. & G.H., 9 Eur. Ct. H. R. at 215-16.
109. Id. at 216.
110. Similarly, the Court in an earlier case had struck down wiretapping by the British
government in the absence of clear statutory procedures for monitoring the phone calls of
private citizens. Malone v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 (1984).
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domestic terrorism for a considerable period. In light of these
similarities, the jurisprudence under Article 8 shows us an apparently
successful role for the courts in requiring the legislative and executive
branches to announce and implement rules to govern surveillance
activities. In Lawrence v. Texas, the majority of the United States
Supreme Court found it useful to cite to the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights.111 Put rhetorically, why should U.S.
constitutional protections against government intrusion be less than
those that exist in the European democracies?
A fifth source supporting the use of the procedural approach
advocated here, is the catalog of instances where the Supreme Court
worked collaboratively with Congress to create surveillance rules. As
discussed above, the Court in Katz and Berger provided a template for
Congress to write the detailed rules in Title III. Similarly, the Court in
Keith supplied terms such as "foreign intelligence" and "agent of a
foreign power" that became the heart of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978. In both instances, decisions of the Supreme
Court invited Congress to write detailed statutes concerning
surveillance. This sort of collaboration of the two branches likely
draws on the strengths of each - the role of the Court in seeing areas
where there are constitutional problems and the role of Congress in
writing prospective rules that take account of the intricacies of a
substantive area of law.112
Based on these five sources, there is a strong case that the courts
should play a role in insisting on the rule of law for searches that
involve emerging or intrusive technologies and complex record-

111. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003). The Supreme Court relied on the
European Court of Human Rights to show the extent to which a position was reasonable or
generally accepted. The Supreme Court said: "Authoritative in all countries that are
members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations now), the [European]
decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in
our Western civilization." Id. This finding of substantial support in Europe for a position
would be analogous to the Supreme Court determining whether a set of surveillance
procedures is reasonable.
1 12. I will not attempt here to make a full defense of why I find Title III and FISA to
have been generally successful statutes. As a brief defense, however, I note that both
statutes were the result of extensive deliberation before passage. Both statutes kept their
essential shape for a long time, with the basic outline of Title III continuing today for
wiretaps and the basic outline of FISA staying roughly the same until the USA PATRIOT
Act in 2001. In addition, both statutes offered significant privacy protections while also
enabling surveillance to.proceed. The level of protection contrasts sharply, for instance, with
the level of protection provided by Congress for pen-register and trap-and-trace orders after
the Supreme Court found no constitutional protection in Smith v. Maryland. Instead of the
relatively strict showing of probable cause, a pen-register order issues where the evidence "is
relevant to an ongoing criminal proceeding." 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2000). In addition, the pen
register statute says that the magistrate shall issue the order upon a certification by law
enforcement that the standard has been met, rather than making an independent evaluation.
See Swire, Administration Proposal Hits the Right Issues But Goes Too Far, supra note 24
(analyzing pen-register rules).
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keeping systems. The mere fact that a person told confidential
information to a doctor, wrote an email to a person, or placed a
personal diary on a secure server does not mean the person has, in the
words of Katz, "knowingly exposed" that information "to the world."
Like the European Court of Human Rights under Article 8, U.S.
courts have much experience with reviewing the actions of the
executive branch113 and the legislature114 to ensure a minimum level of
reasonableness.
CONCLUSION

The King is dead! Long live the King! If Katz is the king of Fourth
Amendment surveillance cases, then that king is dead. The
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test has not been used to find
such expectations beyond the original facts of Katz and Berger. Those
cases themselves are subject to challenge in light of subsequent case
law and the coming of stored telephone calls. If the courts are to play
any role in applying the Fourth Amendment to emerging technologies,
then we need a new king, a new doctrinal explanation of surveillance
and the Fourth Amendment.
To shift metaphors from kings to cats, Katz has already had two
lives. The first was as the protector of privacy envisioned by Justice
Brennan and celebrated in the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
test. The second has been as an invader of privacy. Its abandonment of
the property regime was linked with the abandonment of the "mere
evidence" rule, allowing access to innumerable private papers that had
been inviolate under Boyd v. United States. Other language in Katz
opened the door to the later holdings that individuals had "consented"
to releases of information in the hands of third parties.1 1 5
My attempt here has been to suggest a third life for Katz, or at
least for some court role in applying the Fourth Amendment to the
many intrusive searches that employ new technologies or seek private
information held by third parties. One new role for the courts would
be what many had thought was the old role - a searching substantive
inquiry into whether a search violates a person's "reasonable
expectation of privacy." There is room within the Supreme Court

113. For instance, consider the role of courts in reviewing notice and comment
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
114. For instance, courts have applied intermediate scrutiny to commercial speech
under the doctrine of Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). That test inquires whether "the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest." Id. at 566.
115. See supra text accompanying note 19 (discussing language in Katz to the effect that
"[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection").
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precedent to find a Fourth Amendment interest in e-mails and other
information held in trust by third parties.
Another new role for the courts, and one that deserves far more
attention than it has received to date, is procedural scrutiny requiring
the elected branches to create a reasonable regime for surveillance.
Such procedural review matches well with each institution's strengths
concerning high technology searches. The European Court of Human
Rights has played this role in Europe with good effect. In addition,
collaborative efforts by the courts and the Congress resulted in the
relatively stable and successful regimes under Title III and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, indicating that continued collaboration
between the judiciary and legislature could be a viable option for the
United States.
We live in a democracy. As such, it may seem odd to ask for a new
way for the elected institutions to be overruled by the courts. Yet that
is, of course, a chief purpose of the Fourth Amendment and the Bill of
Rights more generally. The courts should play a role in setting rules
for the unprecedented surveillance enabled by new technologies.
Professor Kerr has helped us see more clearly what the courts have in
fact been doing to date. He errs, I believe, in failing to put forward the
rightful role that courts should play in controlling government
searches in the future.

